This study assessed the knowledge and perception of human biological materials (HBM) and biorepositories among three study groups in South Korea. The relationship between the knowledge and the perception among different groups was also examined by using factor and regression analyses. In a self-reporting survey of 440 respondents, the expert group was found more likely to be knowledgeable and positively perceived than the others. Four factors emerged: Sale and Consent, Flexible Use, Self-Confidence, and Korean Bioethics and Biosafety Action restriction perception. (...) The results indicate that those who are well aware of the existence of biobanks were more positively inclined to receive the Sale and Consent perception. As a result of the need for high quality HBMs and the use of appropriate sampling procedures for every aspect of the collection and use process, the biorepository community should pay attention to ethical, legal, and policy issues. (shrink)

Despite the wide and daunting array of cross-cultural obstacles that the formulation of a global policy on advance directives will clearly pose, the need is equally evident. Specifically, the expansion of medical services driven by medical tourism, just to name one important example, makes this issue urgently relevant. While ensuring consistency across national borders, a global policy will have the additional and perhaps even more important effect of increasing the use of advance directives in clinical settings and enhancing their effectiveness (...) within each country, regardless of where that country's state of the law currently stands. One cross-cultural issue that may represent a major obstacle in formulating, let alone applying, a global policy is whether patient autonomy as the underlying principle for the use of advance directives is a universal norm or a construct of western traditions that must be reconciled with alternative value systems that may place lesser significance on individual choice. A global policy, at a minimum, must emphasize respect for patient autonomy, provision of medical information, limits to the obligations for physicians, and portability. And though the development of a global policy will be no easy task, active engagement in close collaboration with the World Health Organization can make it possible. (shrink)

We develop the theory of Kim-independence in the context of NSOP $_{1}$ theories satisfying the existence axiom. We show that, in such theories, Kim-independence is transitive and that -Morley sequences witness Kim-dividing. As applications, we show that, under the assumption of existence, in a low NSOP $_{1}$ theory, Shelah strong types and Lascar strong types coincide and, additionally, we introduce a notion of rank for NSOP $_{1}$ theories.

Currently, there is a resurgence of interests in phenomenology in education. This article sheds light on the importance of hermeneutical phenomenology in teaching and learning based on the lived experience of a Sioux Indian adolescent boy, elicited from an ethnographic case study conducted at an alternative high school in the US. Employing narrative inquiry, this article seeks phenomenological ways of understanding students' lived experiences and explores the meaning of the pedagogical practice of hermeneutical phenomenology in education. I delve into how (...) hermeneutical understanding of the phenomena of students' lived experience can catapult both students and teachers into the personal growth and development in a reciprocal way. It is my hope that such an understanding will facilitate an educational aim that focuses on the ontology of being and becoming while students' existence is brought to the center of teaching and learning. (shrink)

In an attempt to discover that which makes man distinctively human Wilson takes as his starting point two opposing accounts of what distinguishes man from inanimate objects and indicates why both of them are invalid. The Cartesian concept maintains that man is distinct from the inanimate by virtue of his consciousness, the neo-Wittgensteinian views the distinction as one of behavior and interaction explicable in terms of reason and motives. Wilson agrees that emotion and behavior constitute the primary difference between man (...) and the inanimate but that this human type of activity is analyzable in causal terms. He refutes certain anti-causal arguments that posit a non-contingent connection between an emotion and its object. Wilson rightly points out that a necessary proposition is one that is necessarily true, but a relation cannot be true or false, and therefore cannot be necessarily or contingently true or false. In order to prove his thesis that the emotion-object relationship is one of causality the term "object" is restricted to that which has existential status. Emotions referable to non-existent objects are malfounded emotions and not causally connected. Wilson proposes that the problem does not lend itself to a logico-grammatical analysis of statements that assign objects to emotions, but that the approach requires a study in the philosophy of mind. Such an inquiry discloses that emotion is caused by a mental state, i.e., attention to the object in which a thought or belief about the object causes a certain feeling or reaction. After a rather complicated analysis of the emotion-object relationship in which he considers the questions of materialism, free will intentionality, and rationality, Wilson returns to his original concern and concludes that "a person’s action and his end of action make sense and form a coherent whole because they are rooted in a complex network of feelings and attitudes." This is what makes man distinctively human.—K. R. M. (shrink)

This is a fine work that purports to serve as an introduction to philosophic problems surveyed from the historical perspective. Hartnack chooses to focus on a single work or theme of those philosophers who have significantly contributed to the development of philosophy starting with Heraclitus and ending with Wittgenstein. He renders concise and uncomplicated accounts that capture the nucleus of the problems. What makes this book stand out among so many other similar endeavors is that the expositions are not only (...) true to the problem but, refreshingly, they say neither too little nor too much. Rather they afford the reader a taste of the author’s wares whetting the appetite to further sample the original sources in hopes of finding the solutions to the problematics offered. For the freshman with little or no previous encounter with philosophy this can be an immeasurable bonus since too often he is victimized by arid and tedious readings. Hartnack makes good use of cross referencing providing the work with a thread of continuity, and it is only in his chapter on Kant’s epistemology that we note a deficiency in this area. Had he spelled out the influence of Hume’s skepticism on Kant’s Critique he might have approached the chapter in terms of the question which seems to be most central to Kant’s project, i.e., "Is metaphysics as a science possible?" rather than start out with an analysis of the antinomies that only indirectly point to this problem. However, if there is a deficiency in this chapter, it is offset by an excellent account of Kant’s moral philosophy. Notwithstanding this negative criticism plus the fact that there are several typographical errors, this is a scholarly accomplishment and deserves to be on the bookshelf of not only the beginning philosophy student who wishes to have a viable resource but also for those who have passed beyond this stage and wish to possess a valuable reference tool. Included at the end is a short but worthwhile bibliography.—K.R.M. (shrink)

This compact book provides a much needed study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy which, unfortunately, has not been given the attention that his metaphysics and logic have received. It is Hostler’s contention that this neglect is an indication that the moral system of Leibniz has been incorrectly viewed as tangential to his other systems which are supposed to be Leibniz’ primary concerns. On the contrary, as Hostler points out, Leibniz’ moral philosophy was largely completed before his metaphysical works which were intended (...) to provide the principles for his ethical system. As Leibniz himself says in the New Essays, "you are more in the tradition of metaphysical thought, whereas I am more interested in ethics." Hostler embarks on his task by orienting us to Leibniz’s general metaphysics and proceeds throughout the study to show the interconnection between his morals and metaphysics. Leibniz’ ethics is traditionally grounded in that he acknowledges the essential relationship between the will, reason, and desire. At the same time he breaks with tradition by introducing two apparently contradictory motives for voluntary action. On one hand he proposes an egoism which aims at one’s own welfare, and on the other hand he proposes an altruism that demands that one should seek the welfare of the other. Hostler’s analysis of the concepts of the good, pleasure, happiness, and perfection shows that the contradiction is only apparent, and that egoism and altruism are reconcilable in Leibniz’ system. The good that I seek for myself is achieved when I do good for others, because in doing good to others I realize a perfection to some degree, and my awareness of that perfection is a source of pleasure which identifies itself as the consciousness of an increase in perfection. Hostler discusses the substantive part of Leibniz’ ethics wherein we find that love tempered by prudence produces justice, the demands of which are binding on all beings possessing reason and free will. Consequently, even God is subject to the moral imperative. As the ens perfectissimum God displays both perfect benevolence and wisdom in all his activities, hence he must create the best of all possible worlds, an act that Leibniz describes as "universal justice." Ultimately it can be seen that the reconciliation between egoism and altruism is explained through the principle of pre-established harmony for what affects one affects the others and every act has infinite consequences. It is only our finite intellect that prevents us from seeing the perfection in every object and thereby choosing it. The choice of the lesser good is a manifestation of that radical finitude. Hostler has presented us with a well organized study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy and has managed to situate it in terms of his philosophy as a whole. The brevity of the volume does not diminish its worth as a fine treatment of the subject.—K.R.M. (shrink)

Philosophers committed to the task of coming to grips with reality must face the fact that there are no final solutions and the need to question is fundamental to their project. Taking this as his point of departure Clark proposes that questioning is not confined to the philosopher; it marks every self that is confronted with a given empirical order. Before rendering an analysis of the experience of questioning which is the main thrust of this work, Clark outlines the situation (...) of knowledge in which we find two prevailing viewpoints, the spectator approach, and the performative approach. In the former a subjectivism ensues when the knower passively receives the objects creating a solipsistic prison where the objects take residence precluding any response to the world. In this sense there is no appropriation of meanings as "mine." Clark maintains that this is not what occurs. The self does not merely stand against a world of objects, rather through his intentions he modifies the data conferring meaning on it and in doing so validates his own self. The performative account acknowledges the knower as an active constituting agent who not only intends the facts but uses them in his effort to become a self. A series of historical studies is presented examining these two viewpoints in such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, the empiricists, and finally ending with Kant who represents the synthesis of both perspectives. Using the Critiques as his source, Clark suggests that while the theoretical reason of Kant is a spectator approach, practical reason incorporates the performative account where the "I can" verifies the active self who is responsible for its realization. Kant’s endeavor to construct a transcendental analysis is seen by Clark as primarily an enterprise to set up the necessary conditions for knowledge which can be applied in the practical order. The self only questions for a reason, so that it "can" do something. The "I can" presupposes the "I know," but the "I know" presupposes the "I ask." Clark proposes his own transcendental analysis of questioning and asks what structures are necessary for the experience of questioning in general with total disregard for the content of that question. He attempts to show that the experience involves self discovery, for what is revealed will only be revealed through further self questioning which is always subject to modification. Questioning is a unique and personal response to a world in which I find myself and yet I intend the world, bestowing on it the meaning that is necessary for my fulfillment. There is an analogy between this transcendental analysis and Kant’s, although Clark is quick to point out that he has hesitations about Kant’s treatment of time and space which he has somewhat modified to serve as the necessary structures of the experience of questioning. Philosophy has been pregnant with analyses of the self primarily as a knowing agent and perhaps it is now time for a movement towards the direction that Clark is suggesting. This book may provide the stimulus for more thought on the self as a questioner.—K. R. M. (shrink)

The author has set out to provide an introduction to the theory of knowledge through a more "thorough study of three of its central topics." Unfortunately, he does not accomplish this for many reasons. Arner never discusses the birth of the epistemological problem that can be traced as far back as Plato, nor does he go into the implications of the problem. He chooses rather to give a superficial introduction into some of the more common problematic themes. Assuming this cursory (...) survey of 18 pages to be sufficient he devotes the remainder of the book to an offering of sampling selections by philosophers. Considering that the author furnishes only nine readings it is disconcerting to find C. I. Lewis and H. A. Prichard represented when notably absent are thinkers of such import as Plato, James, and Husserl among others. That no fewer pages are devoted to Lewis than to Kant and Descartes is indicative that Arner has missed the target. When a series of texts is used at the introductory level to offer a clear exposition of the philosophers’ thoughts, problems, methods, and attempted solutions, it is incumbent on the author to provide a general but thorough introduction to the theme along with appropriate brief introductions accompanying the particular readings. The fact that Arner has failed to do this, paired with the brevity and insignificance of some of the selections makes this book of little value to the student who professes no prior familiarity with the epistemological question.—K.R.M. (shrink)

This provocative book provides a stimulating study of the self that is somewhat reminiscent of Husserl’s transcendental ego. But for Earle the ego is absolute and infinite, yet so unique and singular that it precludes any descriptive analysis in terms of a universal structure. As the primary and absolute source of objectification the ego is opposed to these "others" to which something "happens" as the necessary is opposed to the contingent. The realm of happening is the realm of existence, and (...) the ego as the constitutive agent of objects and their meanings transcends this world, and in this sense is non-existent. Yet it is, and its mode of being is "eternity." Paradoxically, the self is both absolute and independent, but so relatively dependent on others for its fulfillment that it can only realize itself as a person on the level of intersubjectivity and most significantly in transcendental love. Earle remains insistent on the incommunicability and singularity of the I and maintains that if there is no common nature in which the I partakes neither is there any universal or abstract moral ought. Value is transcendentally grounded and is what I choose it to be and what I decide ought to be. There are some valuable critical accounts found in this work on Husserl, Sartre, and a very fine in depth refutation of James’ theory of memory. For Earle memory is the one essential way for the transcendental ego to preserve itself "amid the distraction and chaos of its chosen existence." The last two chapters are devoted to a phenomenology of horror and death, and although it is somewhat unrelated to the main topic it does make interesting reading. The book is replete with rich material for critical thinking and offers a challenge to investigate the self from a new and what may appear to some a radical approach. An index facilitates the reading.—K. R. M. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Past, Present—and Future Perfect?Taking Psychiatry Beyond Its Single Message MythologiesK. W. M. Fulford (bio)I am grateful to John Sadler and his colleagues for their generous invitation to contribute to this collection marking Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (PPP)'s thirtieth birthday. True to our editorial tradition of "no nonsense" publishing, the "ask" was a reflection on PPP's past, present and future, limited to 500 words. In fact, one word does it (...) for me—collegiality.Collegiality was our watch word from the start. I still treasure a group photo taken at an early pre-meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry (AAPP) convened by Michael Schwartz at his home in 1992, when, among other initiatives, PPP was conceived through transferring our then-nascent journal proposal from a small British publishing house to its current international publisher, the Johns Hopkins University Press. Michael and I had met earlier by phone when he had called the Royal College of Psychiatrists in London to enquire about its recently launched Philosophy Group and (by mere chance) I happened to be standing next to the person who took the call! PPP, with John and myself its founder editors, was subsequently born as, and has remained, a joint venture between our two groups: and Peter Zachar's recent initiative in building closer links with the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry (INPP) has taken us an important step towards the vision shared by Michael, John and myself that PPP should grow to reflect and represent a global open society of philosophy and mental health.As a pointer to the future, this global open society was no mere utopian vision but a joint commitment to what we conceived as a necessary ambition. Contemporary disenchantment with the repeated failures of translation of current narrowly empirical models of psychiatry, points to the truth of our German colleague, Paul Hoff's, characterization of the history of psychiatry as a history of serial collapses into single message mythologies. This disenchantment might seem to offer an opportunity for colonial expansion of philosophy into psychiatry (a re-assertion, perhaps, of phenomenology?). But PPP was born out of the "decade of the brain" and has remained throughout an ally of, not competitor to, the neurosciences. [End Page 3] So, while it is true that, with Peter's initiative, and with editorial and other innovations introduced by John, PPP is actively extending its reach (to new areas of philosophy, and to new voices, informed notably by experience as well as by training), this expansion remains a collegial not colonial enlargement of the field. I need hardly point to the challenges presented by the inclusive ambitions of such enlargement (not least to maintaining the highest standards of editorial and peer review). But PPP's collegiality provides the foundation for the work needed to deliver on these challenges. Even if imperfectly realized, this collegiality will help to take us beyond the single message mythologies by which our discipline has too long been hobbled. [End Page 4]K. W. M. Fulford K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford is a Fellow of St Catherine's College and Member of the Philosophy Faculty, University of Oxford; Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Mental Health, University of Warwick Medical School; and Founder Director of the Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice, St Catherine's College, Oxford (valuesbasedpractice.org).Copyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 387-394 [Access article in PDF] Psychosis Good and Bad:Values-Based Practice and the Distinction Between Pathological and Nonpathological Forms of Psychotic Experience Mike C. Jackson and K. W. M. Fulford IN TWO PAPERS in this issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, Marek Marzanski and Mark Bratton (2002) and Caroline Brett (2002) develop important critiques, from the perspectives respectively of Christian theology and Eastern philosophy, (...) of our 1997 analysis of the distinction between pathological and nonpathological forms of psychotic experience (Jackson and Fulford 1997).In this response, we briefly summarize the main points from our 1997 analysis; we consider, separately, the important although very different challenges to that analysis from the perspectives of our two critics; and we briefly indicate the main lines of recent developments in policy, practice, and research in mental health as they relate to this important area of human experience. The Jackson and Fulford (1997) Analysis In our 1997 paper, we presented three case studies from a larger series (Jackson 1991, 1997, 2001) selected with the express aim of bringing into focus the conceptual difficulties that arise at the borderline between psychotic illness and what we called benign spiritual experience. On the basis of these case studies we argued thatspiritual experiences, which are essentially benign, can involve explicitly psychotic phenomenology; traditional psychiatric diagnostic methods, which focus on the form and content of beliefs and experiences, are not capable of distinguishing between pathological and nonpathological forms of such psychotic experiences; [End Page 387]evaluation of such experiences (and claims about "illness" and health more generally) necessarily involves value judgments as well as judgments about matters of fact (specifically, the "facts" of traditional descriptive psychopathology); and more specifically, the distinction between pathological and nonpathological phenomena concerns the way in which they are embedded in the structure of the values and beliefs by which the actions of the subjects concerned are defined: "In the case of pathological psychotic phenomena," we argued, "there is a radical failure of action.... In the case of spiritual psychotic phenomena, action is radically enhanced" (Jackson and Fulford 1997, 55).We then proposed a cognitive problem-solving model of psychotic experiences. This model suggests that such experiences can be a normal and adaptive psychological response to existential crises, such as loss of meaning or purpose in life, coming to terms with death or bereavement, and so on (Batson and Ventis 1982; Jackson, 1991, 1997, 2001). The model is consistent with a subsequent position paper published by the British Psychological Society arguing the case for a psychological formulation of psychotic experiences and cognitive-behavioural methods in their management (2000).In the case of nonpathological psychotic experience, the psychotic elements of the experience promote a paradigm shift in the individual's underlying assumptions, which effectively resolves their impasse and allows them to move forward. This is normally a self-limiting process, in that when the individual is able to utilize their insight, it acts to resolve the stress which triggered it. In pathological psychosis, this process fails for various possible reasons, which were not explored in any depth in that paper (but see Jackson 2001 for a more detailed discussion). The Challenge From Marzanski and Bratton Marek Marzanski and Mark Bratton reexamine the questions raised by our cases from a Christian theological perspective (Marzanski and Bratton 2002). They suggest a theologically based definition of spiritual experience according to which the criteria for "genuine" experience concerns its context within the development of the individual's religious faith. In Bratton and Marzanski's account, these criteria are based on a Christian value system.They present three cases of their own, which, in contrast to the three cases in our 1997 paper, vividly illustrate how phenomena that may be valued negatively from a medical perspective (i.e., as defined by us in terms of their consequences for action), may, at one and the same time, be valued positively from a religious perspective (i.e., in terms of their consequences for the... (shrink)

In this paper, we propose to analyze the phenomenon of Christian prayer by way of combining two different analytical frameworks. We start by applying Schutz’s theories of “intersubjectivity,” “inner time,” “politheticality,” and “multiple realities,” and then proceed by drawing on the ideas and insights of linguistic philosophers, notably, Wittgenstein’s “language-game,” Austin’s “speech act,” and Evans’s “logic of self-involvement”. In conjoining these accounts, we wish to demonstrate how their combination sheds new light on understanding the phenomenon of prayer. Prayer is a (...) complex phenomenon that involves two major dimensions: the private and the social, as Matthew and Acts, respectively, demonstrate. Schutz’s study of the phenomenon of “inner time” and the “polithetical” structure of consciousness, at both the subjective and intersubjective level, provides a useful lens to analyze these two dimensions. In addition, prayer, in following a specific set of rules, can also be considered as a specific, i.e., religious “language-game”. In the last analysis, however, we propose to analyze prayer within the Schutzian framework of “multiple realities,” “enclaves,” and “symbolic appresentation,” which permits accessing the “religious finite province of meaning” in the very midst of the paramount reality of everyday life. In a nutshell, we claim that Christian prayer is a practice of constructing and living within a “religious province of meaning” in the everyday world; it is a practice that revolves around self-involving language-activities such as praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting to God, which enable the praying subject to transfigure the language of everydayness and “see through” the world of everyday life in order to let it appear in a different light, e.g., the light of grace, gift, and salvation. (shrink)

This article is a response to the proposal, made by Thornton elsewhere in this special issue of PPP, that the "space of reasons" (as defined by the work particularly of Sellars and McDowell) might contain the conceptual resources for naturalizing biological function statements without reducing their ostensibly teleological meanings to the "space of causes". I agree with Thornton, (1) that ordinary reductive naturalism (as in Wakefield's work) is unable to mark the key distinction between a functional system's function(s) and its (...) other properties, and (2) that his proposed non-reductive naturalism (or neo-naturalism) is able to mark this distinction. I disagree with him, though, that neo-naturalism is value-free. The space of reasons certainly contains much that is important for psychopathology (meanings, notably). I argue, though, against Thornton, that neo-naturalism is able to define functions only because the "space of reasons" smuggles into the language of biology an evaluative element of meaning, deeply hidden but still logically operative, in the teleological sense in which biological functions are explanatory. In the final section of the paper, I set Thornton's proposal in a wider historical perspective. (shrink)

From the perspective of values-based practice, there is much of interest in Lorenzo Gilardi and Giovanni Stanghellini's "I am a Schizophrenic." Their dialogue exhibits many of the key elements of VBP, it exemplifies the particular challenges presented by VBP in mental health, it illustrates the power of phenomenology in meeting these challenges, and it points by extension to an insight into contemporary psychiatry's professional identity as a medical profession.VBP is a resource for working with values—with what matters or is important (...) to those concerned—in healthcare. Avoiding preset answers, it offers instead a process that supports those concerned in a given situation... (shrink)

Ten years ago the Royal Institute of Philosophy marked the establishment of the Society for Applied Philosophy with a series of public lectures, published in an earlier book in this series, under the title Philosophy and Practice. Looking back it i s hard to believe this was only ten years ago. Applied philosophy still has its critics. But it is now so pervasive, so much the norm, that it seems to have been with us always. Law, medicine, education, nursing, the (...) environment, politics, economics … almost it seems, no subject is quite respectable nowadays without its philosophy and its philosophical exponents. (shrink)

This chapter explains the concept of effort on the basis of evidence from experimental and cognitive psychology, demonstrates how it has been used in conducting studies of brain activity, and goes on to examine the individual differences that play a role in determining the efficiency of brain networks associated with effortful control. It also reviews certain educational training methods; those when used among children can change these networks, along with conditional changes developed in adults through meditation training. The findings reveal (...) that meditation helps in producing better attentional performance and the subjective condition related to effort. The chapter also investigates how these training methods play a role in determining the concept of flow. (shrink)

The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. (...) To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos : Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K. (shrink)

The importance of communities in strengthening the ethics of international collaborative research is increasingly highlighted, but there has been much debate about the meaning of the term ‘community’ and its specific normative contribution. We argue that ‘community’ is a contingent concept that plays an important normative role in research through the existence of morally significant interplay between notions of community and individuality. We draw on experience of community engagement in rural Kenya to illustrate two aspects of this interplay: (i) that (...) taking individual informed consent seriously involves understanding and addressing the influence of communities in which individuals’ lives are embedded; (ii) that individual participation can generate risks and benefits for communities as part of the wider implications of research. We further argue that the contingent nature of a community means that defining boundaries is generally a normative process itself, with ethical implications. Community engagement supports the enactment of normative roles; building mutual understanding and trust between researchers and community members have been important goals in Kilifi, requiring a broad range of approaches. Ethical dilemmas are continuously generated as part of these engagement activities, including the risks of perverse outcomes related to existing social relations in communities and conditions of ‘half knowing’ intrinsic to processes of developing new understandings. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)